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Book Review
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCI-
ETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. By
CHARLES F. WILKINSON.* NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY
PRESS 1987. Pp. xi, 225. $18.50.
Reviewed by Erik M. Jensen"
Even for most people with legal training, American Indian law
is a curiosity.I It has a formal definition that sounds suitably intel-
lectual2-the "body of jurisprudence... defining and implementing
the relationship among the United States, Indian tribes and individ-
uals, and the states" 3 -but what is it? Indians are American citi-
zens after all,' and it is peculiar, to say the least, to have a body of
law that facilitates the separation of one racial or ethnic group from
the rest of American society.5
Indian law does not fit within the usual legal-academic
pigeonholes.6 It is not simply a subset of constitutional law,
although the provisions dealing with Indians,7 the only references in
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
** Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. The author thanks
the following blameless persons for helpful comments on an earlier draft: Jonathan L. Entin,
Patricia J. Harris, Helen B. Jensen, and Peter D. Junger.
1. A brief, unscientific survey suggests that Case Western Reserve's Law Review has
not published an article on Indian law in its nearly forty-year history, and this law school has
at no time offered a course in the subject.
2. As compared, say, to administrative law or property.
3. FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (R. Strickland ed.
1982) [hereinafter 1982 COHEN HANDBOOK].
4. The Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982))
provided that all American Indians "born within the territorial limits of the United States"
are U.S. citizens. Prior to that time, Indians could become citizens generally only through
naturalization. See 1982 COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 142-43.
5. On the difficulty of justifying a policy of separation for the American Indian, see
Jensen, Monroe G. McKay and American Indian Law: In Honor of Judge McKay's Tenth
Anniversary on the Federal Bench, 1987 B.Y.U. L. Rnv. - (in press).
6. If law students are exposed to any aspect of Indian law in a typical curriculum, it is
in a course considering the nature of "property." See, eg., C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROP-
ERTY AND LAW ch. 1 (2d ed. 1985); C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, PROPERTY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INsTITUTION 30-48 (2d ed. 1983).
7. Congress is given power "[to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis
added). In addition, "Indians not taxed" are excluded from the population count for pur-
poses of apportioning representatives and direct taxes. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; amend. XIV, § 2.
The typical constitutional law casebook makes mention of Indian law fleetingly, if at all. For
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the Constitution that are arguably racial or ethnic in character," are
fundamental components of the field. International law provides no
better fit: Indian tribes are "nations" and were often dealt with by
treaty,9 but they are not foreign nations."0 History is more impor-
tant here than in nearly all other legal disciplines 1-Indian law
necessarily is concerned with old cases, statutes, and treaties 12-- but
historical understanding merely begins the legal analysis in any par-
ticular case. And, while Indians have been among this nation's
most oppressed minorities, the civil rights laws generally do not ap-
ply to Indians in the same way that they apply to members of other
minority groups.1
3
The list of subjects to which Indian law has connections could
be extended, but the point, I hope, has been made: in its scope and
in its primary materials, Indian law is sui generis. It has become a
example, a reader may not be able to tell from the editing or the synopsis that Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), had anything to do with Indians. See, eg., W. LOCK-
HART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 380 (6th ed. 1986).
Tribe (who else?) gives space to Indian law in his monumental treatise, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1012-19 (1978), but he is unusual in that regard. See C. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 206-07 n.88 (1987).
8. Although three constitutional provisions relate to slavery, none uses the term
"slave" or "slavery," and none makes reference to any racial group. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. Even the special legal treatment of the Indian is
generally not viewed for legal purposes as racial in nature; rather, it is seen as the outcome of
one government's dealing with another. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes,
439 U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) ("It is settled that 'the unique legal status of Indian tribes...'
permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians"); United
States v. Antelope, 431 U.S. 641 (1977) (federal regulation of Indians not based on race); C.
WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 85-86.
9. Treating with Indian tribes was ended in 1871, but the treaties in effect at that time
continue in force unless they have since been abrogated. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1,
16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
10. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (tribes are "domestic
dependent nations," not foreign states; Cherokee Nation suit in Supreme Court against state
of Georgia therefore dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction). Perhaps international law should be
important in Indian law analysis, but "Indian law today is mainly a body of domestic law."
C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 81.
11. "[Indian legal history] is... the contemporary life blood out of which current In-
dian law problems are often resolved by the courts." Clinton, The Curse of Relevance: An
Essay on the Relationship of Historical Research to Federal Indian Litigation, 28 ARiz. L.
Rav. 29, 31 (1986); see C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 13 ("Indian policy is one of the few
threads of federal activity that is continuous from the founding of the Republic, when Indian
relations was one of the most pressing federal issues.").
12. The continuing vitality of old Indian law cases is demonstrated by the fact that Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the founda-
tion for jurisdictional law in this area, C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 30 & 96, has been
cited more often by federal and state courts since 1970 than all but three other antebellum
Supreme Court opinions. Id. at 30 & 158 n.126.
13. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act specifically excludes Indian
tribes from its application. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). A tribe may therefore give prefer-
ence in hiring to its own members without liability under the Act. See Wardle v. Ute Indian
Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980).
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specialty recognized (by a few people, anyway) both in academia14
and in practice. But will anyone other than the few specialists care
about Professor Wilkinson's new book? National attention is at-
tracted every once in a while when an Indian tribe seeks to reclaim,
or be compensated for, land that long ago passed into other hands, 5
or when an Indian is prosecuted for a religiously motivated killing
of an animal protected under an endangered species statute. 6 In
general, however, because the Indian population is small' 7 and be-
cause it is concentrated in enclaves far from major population cen-
ters,18 Indian law seems irrelevant to most Americans, including
most law professors. The white man's contradictory images of the
Indian, the noble savage and the warring barbarian, may appear
everywhere, 19 but the Indian himself does not.
Charles Wilkinson, one-time staff attorney with the Native
American Rights Fund and long-time legal academic at the Univer-
sities of Oregon and Colorado, has been a leader in the study of
Indian law, and his work appears to be having an effect: there are
hints of increasing interest in the field. Wilkinson neither claims
nor deserves all of the credit for this, of course. He is riding a wave
that would have arisen in any case; the black civil rights movement,
to which the post-1960 fervor in the Indian movement can be
traced,2" has been too strong to expect otherwise. Nevertheless,
Wilkinson has been a significant force. American Indians, Time,
and the Law is this prolific writer's latest attempt to bring order out
of jurisprudential chaos; it is a major contribution to our under-
standing of what Indian law is and why it matters.
As Wilkinson demonstrates, there are many reasons for all of us
to care. First and foremost, Indian law is a subject of great moral
importance, and it would be so even if the nation had made no
14. Two casebooks exist, one coedited by Professor Wilkinson. M. PRICE & R. CLIN-
TON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1983); D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW (2d ed. 1986); see also W. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUT-
SHELL (1981).
15. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985) (holding that
no legal doctrine bars tribal suit for damages for occupation and use of tribal land allegedly
conveyed illegally in 1795).
16. See United States v. Dion, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986) (tribal treaty rights to hunt eagles
held to have been expressly abrogated by Bald Eagle Protection Act and Endangered Species
Act); Shabecoff, Panther Case: Indian Rights m Wildlife Law, N.Y. Times (nat'l ed.), Apr.
15, 1987, at 1 (Department of Justice charges chairman of Seminole tribe with killing panther
in violation of Endangered Species Act).
17. The 1980 census showed 1,418,195 Indians (a figure that may be too high), about 0.5
percent of the United States population. D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note 14, at 6.
18. Not all Indians live on reservations, of course; about half the Indian population lives
in off-reservation areas. Many Indians have been fully assimilated into the predominantly
white society, and others have settled in groups in large population centers. Moreover, some
reservations are close to cities of substantial size. See id. at 7.
19. See R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN (Vintage ed. 1979); M. KAMMEN,
PEOPLE OF PARADOX 255-56 (Vintage ed. 1973).
20. See D. McNICKLE, THEY CAME HERE FIRST 274 (revised ed. 1975).
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promises to the tribes.2" Indian law is important morally because a
multi-ethnic country defines itself, at least in part, by the way it
treats its minority populations.22 Just as the black civil rights
movement forced a reexamination of the meaning of America and
thus had its effects felt by all Americans, the moral impact of Indian
law reaches each of us. 2
3
Indian law has come to be of great practical importance as well,
particularly in areas of the country with significant Indian popula-
tions. It encompasses issues as sensitive24 (and as complex) as the
limits on state jurisdiction within Indian country. For example,
may a state impose its own hunting and fishing laws on non-Indian
sportsmen within the boundaries of a reservation if the tribe has its
own comprehensive regulatory system? 25 To answer that type of
question-and jurisdiction is the great issue of modem Indian
law26--may require consideration of the extent of retained tribal
sovereignty, 27 the extent to which federal law has preempted exer-
cises of state jurisdiction,28 the prerogatives necessary for tribal self-
21. In fact, Wilkinson may overstate the extent to which the moral issues are dependent
on the nation's promises to the tribes. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
22. "The 'Indian problem'.. . challenges the most precious assumptions about what this
country stands for--cultural pluralism, equity and justice, the integrity of the individual,
freedom of conscience and action, and the pursuit of happiness." SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON
INDIAN EDUCATION, SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INDIAN EDUCA-
TION: A NATIONAL TRAGEDY-A NATIONAL CHALLENGE, S. REP. No. 501, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
23. See Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953) ("Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from
fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more
than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.").
24. See, eg., Johnson, Indian Hunting Rights Ignite a Wisconsin Dispute, N.Y. Times
(nat'l ed.), May 16, 1987, at 8 (describing ill feeling between whites and Indians after federal
judge ruled, on basis of 1837 treaty, that Chippewa tribe had hunting and fishing rights ex-
tending beyond the reservation).
25. The answer was negative, at least in a case in which few tribal nonmembers owned
land within reservation boundaries. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324 (1983); cf. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (state permitted to enforce its
game laws within a reservation on lands owned in fee simple by non-Indians, where substan-
tial amounts of such land existed).
26. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 2, 87; see eg., California v. Cabazon Band, 107
S. Ct. 1083 (1987) (state may not regulate bingo games conducted on reservation); Washing-
ton v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state may impose tax on reservation sales of
cigarettes made to tribal nonmembers). Equally sensitive questions of a tribe's power over
tribal nonmembers on the reservation also arise. See, eg., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribe may not impose criminal sanctions on tribal nonmember for
acts done on the reservation).
27. "Sovereignty" informs the preemption analysis, see infra note 28 and accompanying
text, and it is the critical element in determining whether an exercise of state jurisdiction
infringes on tribal self-government. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
28. Wilkinson calls this issue "subject matter preemption." C. WILKINSON, supra note
7, at 96-99. Although apparently derived from the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2, and the Treaty Clause, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, the preemption analysis differs from that in
other areas of the law. Balancing state interests against federal and tribal interests is re-
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government, 29 and the nature of the tribal3° and state3 1 interests at
stake.
The importance of Indian law is evidenced by its apparently dis-
proportionate representation on the Supreme Court docket. The
field would be significant if only because the Court treats it as such.
Modem high court Indian litigation began quietly in the 1958
term,32 but an explosion followed. Since 1980 the Court has been
averaging more than five Indian law cases a term, more than it
hears in either securities law or bankruptcy.33 As the numbers have
increased, so too has the importance of the issues under considera-
tion. 34 And the pace shows no sign of slackening-to the dismay of
some justices.35
American Indians, Time, and the Law measures up to the lofty
subject it addresses. It is worthy of attention on many levels. It is
quired, see Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983), and therefore
a sufficiently strong state interest may be able to outweigh an otherwise preemptive federal
statute. See Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Implications for Fed-
eral Indian Law, 64 OR. L. REv. 667, 678-87, 696 (1986).
29. "Geographical preemption" is the term used by Wilkinson. C. WILKINSON, supra
note 7, at 99-106; see infra note 32 (stating the test). Geographical preemption provides a
theoretically independent bar to the exercise of state jurisdiction within reservation bounda-
ries, but, as with the subject matter preemption analysis (see supra note 28), the Supreme
Court has required weighing state interests against federal and tribal interests. The two tests
may therefore have become indistinguishable. See Feldman, supra note 28, at 677-78.
30. For example, hunting and fishing, so closely tied to the past of many tribes, consti-
tute significant tribal interests. Wilkinson suggests that a focus on the nature of the tribal
interests at stake in the Supreme Court's jurisdictional cases may help reconcile the otherwise
disparate case holdings. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 110-11.
31. See supra notes 28 & 29 (balancing tests require taking state interests into account).
32. The critical case was Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), which held that a tribe
had exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from a contract, entered into on the reservation,
between a non-Indian plaintiff and an Indian defendant. The case stated the "infringement"
test applicable to determine "geographic preemption" (see supra note 29): "Essentially, ab-
sent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action in-
fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
358 U.S. at 220; see C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 1-3.
33. See C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 2, 123-32. In the 1986 term alone the Court
decided cases dealing with riparian rights, United States v. Cherokee Nation, 107 S. Ct. 1487
(1987); state.regulation of bingo games on an Indian reservation, California v. Cabazon Band,
107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987); exhaustion of tribal court remedies, Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987); the extent of the Interior Secretary's obligation to determine
whether Alaskan oil leases would affect Alaska Natives' subsistence rights and culture,
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987); and the Indian Land Consol-
idation Act of 1983, Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
34. The emphasis in the cases has shifted from essentially private disputes to issues of
public law. C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 2.
35. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 176 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring and dissenting) ("well-defined body of principles is essential in order to end the
need for case-by-case litigation which has plagued this area [scope of Indian immunity from
state taxation]"); Taylor, Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. Times (nat'l ed.), Dec.
22, 1986, at 12 (Justice Blackmun commented that "[i]f one's in the doghouse with the Chief
[Justice], he gets the crud. He gets the tax cases, and some of the Indian cases.").
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in part a useful doctrinal primer, although that is not its stated pur-
pose36 and the book does considerably more than that. Wilkinson is
a legal realist of sorts,3 7 seeking the "undercurrents of doctrine" in
the leading Supreme Court cases,38 rather than merely explicating
the principles enunciated by the Court. Because jurisdictional doc-
trine has become so confused39 and the decisions so fact depen-
dent," doctrinal explication alone may paint a distorted picture of
Indian law.
The volume serves also as a ready introduction to Indian law
literature. Written in the law review tradition, its footnotes-burst-
ing with imaginative suggestions, intriguing information, and useful
citations-nearly outweigh the text. An hour's browsing should
convince the most confirmed footnote-hater that value may be
found at the back of a book or the bottom of a page.
Most important, American Indians, Time, and the Law is an ex-
tended essay on a continuing theme: the effect of the passage of
time. Indian law, more than any other American legal discipline,
still looks to the early years of the Republic to resolve present dis-
putes, and therein lies much of the subject's complexity and unpre-
dictability. It is, in Wilkinson's words, a "time-warped field,""a
"better understood in terms of time periods than doctrines."'4 The
recurring question in the modem era of Indian law, he argues, is
"whether and to what extent old promises should be honored to-
day."'4 3 Those promises, reflected in treaties and treaty substitutes,
were to preserve a "measured separatism," a "comprehensive tribal
sovereignty within reservation boundaries."'  It was understood by
both the tribes and the federal government, Wilkinson convincingly
maintains, that distinct tribal governments were to control distinct
36. C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 3. That function is already well served by the re-
cently revised 1982 COHEN HANDBOOK, see supra note 3, itself a product of Wilkinson's
expertise. The Handbook was originally prepared by Felix S. Cohen, a prominent legal phi-
losopher, advocate for Indian rights, and high official in the Department of Interior. See C.
WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 57-59; Felix S. Cohen, 9 RUT. L. REv. 345, 348 (1954). The
Department itself prepared a heavily criticized revision of the Handbook in 1958, reflecting
the then-prevailing assimilationist philosophy of the Eisenhower administration. The 1982
revision, undertaken by a group of Indian law scholars including Wilkinson (as managing
editor), made the volume a continuingly useful reference work while retaining the flavor of
Felix Cohen.
37. As was Felix Cohen. See supra note 36; see also R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982) (discussing Cohen and other proponents of
instrumentalism).
38. C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 3.
39. See supra notes 28 & 29.
40. The lack of consistent principles is partly responsible for the unending stream of
litigation. See, eg., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
41. C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 13.
42. Id. at ix.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 22.
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tribal homelands; those governments and homelands would be
largely immune from state interference but would be subject to the
protection of federal plenary power.4 5
American Indians, Time, and the Law is particularly rich in
demonstrating the inherent difficulties in answering the recurring
question: which, if any, of the old promises should be honored?
The most straightforward answer-that of course old promises
should be fully honored today-is misleading in its simplicity. To
begin with, the concept of a measured separatism does not emerge,
fully formed, from the old documents, which were often written in
the most general language."a Moreover, not only has the meaning
of the language used to make the promises changed over time, but
so too have conditions: new states have been created47 since treaties
were ratified, and, for better or for worse, no Indian tribe can return
to the position it occupied before the white man's arrival.4" Even if
we could easily put ourselves in the interpretational shoes of those
in the mid-nineteenth century, whose shoes would we occupy?
How do we take account of the fact that the representatives of the
federal government and the Indian tribes did not speak the same
language? How do we deal with the overreaching that seriously
tainted these agreements? How do we take account of the fact that
promises were made to non-Indians as well and that non-Indians
therefore may also have developed legitimate expectations of gov-
ernmental support?49
The passage of time is confusingly felt in still another way: au-
thority from different eras in Indian law history is in many respects
irreconcilable. Federal policy toward the Indian has alternated be-
tween emphasis on assimilation of the Indian into American society
and emphasis on separation,5" and the present legal structure re-
tains elements from the conflicting historical periods. 51 Some stat-
utes and cases may have had their underlying purposes and
45. Id. at 14-19. The tribes have pressed to be "permanent institutions in national pol-
icy," id. at 75, and the Supreme Court cases, Wilkinson argues, are consistent with that
understanding. However, because Congress can unilaterally abrogate the old treaties and
because the statutory Indian law structure is also subject to congressional whim, the federal
power is a two-edged sword: "It is on Capitol Hill that it all can be lost." Id. at 82.
46. See id. at 15 & 94.
47. Many treaties were signed at a time when the land reserved to the tribes did not fall
within state boundaries, and therefore the absence of treaty language regarding state powers
within reservation boundaries is not significant in resolving jurisdictional disputes. See id. at
100-02.
48. "The promise of a measured separatism... can fairly be called into question simply
because the demography of Indian country is so changed from what it was when the promises
were made." Id. at 22.
49. For example, the ancestors of non-Indians holding land within reservation bounda-
ries for the most part acquired the land perfectly properly. They may even have been en-
couraged to make the acquisition by federal policy. Id. at 111.
50. See id. at 13 ("Indian policy has been cyclic").
51. See id. at 29 (opinions are irreconcilable "because they base their foundations on
different zones of time").
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holdings strengthened by the passage of time; others have been
eviscerated.
As if the passage of time did not provide sufficient difficulty,
answering the recurring question is further complicated-and Wil-
kinson may not emphasize this enough-by the jurisprudential
quicksand in which Indian law is grounded. The resolution of to-
day's cases requires the application of western legal principles that
were entirely foreign to the Indian. For example, reflecting their
status as once distinct nations, tribes retain many aspects of sover-
eignty.5 2 That concept continues to play an important role in deter-
mining whether federal law has preempted exercises of state
jurisdiction within Indian country,53 and it is a critical concern in
determining whether state authority infringes upon tribal self-gov-
ernment. a As currently interpreted, the concept of sovereignty has
served to protect Indian interests,55 but tribal advocates are para-
doxically forced to urge the application of a foreign doctrine to pro-
tect tribal interests. 5
6
Riddled with theoretical complications and inconsistencies, In-
dian law has nevertheless survived. So too have the tribes, many of
them anyway, even though the pressures to deny the continued
force of ancient promises have been substantial. The Indians' resist-
ance to assimilation has been the primary factor in tribal survival,
but Wilkinson gives much credit to the Supreme Court as well.
Indeed, one of the most striking qualities of this book, written
by a strong tribal supporter, is its generally optimistic tone. Much
of the current Indian law literature is despairing or angry, filled
with a sense of betrayal. Wilkinson, however, rejects gloom and
doom. He concludes that, rather than deferring to changed circum-
stances, the Supreme Court has generally enforced the old promises,
thereby protecting tribal existence. As a result, the Indian policy of
52. "Sovereignty," as used in the cases, has come to mean "the power of a people to
make governmental arrangements to protect and limit personal liberty by social control." Id.
at 55. But see Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, 897 (discussing "myth
of Indian sovereignty"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974).
53. Sovereignty provides a "backdrop" to the subject matter preemption analysis. See
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); supra note 28. It is
not entirely accurate to say that sovereignty "continues" to play a role, in that sovereignty
had largely disappeared from Supreme Court analysis until revived implicitly in Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), and explicitly in McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. See C. WILKIN-
SON, supra note 7, at 57 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886)) ("Indi-
ans are within the geographical limits of the United States. The soil and the people within
these limits are under the political control of the Government of the United States, or of the
States of the Union. There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.").
54. See supra note 29.
55. Assuming, that is, that "measured separatism" serves Indian interests. See supra
text accompanying note 45.
56. Wilkinson suggests that social scientists have given the designation "government" to
even the most primitive tribal arrangements that existed before the white man. C. WILKIN-
SON, supra note 7, at 100. That, too, applies a western label to a nonwestern arrangement of
power.
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the United States is "one of the most progressive of any nation. 57
In particular, the cases have given remarkable scope to sovereignty,
concluding "that tribal powers will be measured initially by the sov-
ereign authority that an Indian tribe exercised, or might theoreti-
cally have exercised, in a time so different from our own as to be
beyond the power of most of us to articulate." 8 And the Court,
with few exceptions, has required that interpretational questions be
resolved in the tribes' favor:
[T]he Supreme Court has put all who deal with Indian laws...
on notice that this is a special field and that words may not mean
what they appear to mean. If Indians are involved, you should
infuse all federal laws, old and new, with the policy of the special
Indian trust relationship and read those laws with a heavy bias in
favor of Indian and tribal prerogatives. If the first reading does
not produce a result in favor of the Indians, you should read the
document again. And once again-with an inventive mind. 59
Infused with scholarly passion, American Indians, Time, and the
Law is a remarkably hopeful statement of the likelihood of tribal
survival.
Of course, one cannot recommend a book on Indian law without
reservations." A fundamental difficulty with American Indians,
Time, and the Law, to this reader at least, is its failure to provide a
persuasive philosophical justification for the policy of measured sep-
aratism. Certainly the policy has strong visceral support; the ten-
dency in nearly all modem writing on Indian law is to take for
granted the desirability of separation and, in some cases, to urge its
extension.61 But why?
Wilkinson does not totally ignore the issue; he recognizes the
need to reconcile Indian policy "with the egalitarian and libertarian
laws and traditions" of the United States.6 2 And he purports to ask
and to answer an "ultimate question,.., how can the United States,
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Stylistic nits can be picked. The publisher bills the book as being written in "an
edifying, nontechnical style," but Wilkinson devotes an entire section to "nonuser." This
reviewer, unschooled in the intricacies of property law (and grateful to be so, see supra note
2), could understand the important issue raised: whether tribes lose traditional sovereign
powers, such as the power to tax or to regulate hunting and fishing, by not exercising those
rights for a number of years. But it took several readings to realize that "nonuser" was not a
misprint. Try reading this "edifying, nontechnical" sentence: "In analyzing the nonuser of a
tribe's regulatory authority over non-Indian hunting and fishing, Judge Monroe G. McKay of
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals set out the ultimate philosophical basis for the protection
against nonuser due to encroachment .. " C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 46.
61. See, e.g., Comment, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political
Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 586-602 (1987).
62. C. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at ix & 89.
[Vol. 38:318
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW
consistent with its democratic ideals, allow race-based Indian tribes
to govern the non-Indians who have lawfully entered those lands to
live and to do business over the course of ensuing generations?" 63
That question puts the issue of separation in one of the ways it is
most likely to be litigated, and, with the issue so phrased, Wilkinson
responds persuasively. Tribes are pre-constitutional as well as ex-
tra-constitutional, and they are therefore not bound by many of the
same restrictions that would apply to other constitutionally recog-
nized segments of American society. Moreover, most tribal non-
members subject to tribal governance are in much the same position
as noncitizen residents of another country. Finally, most such non-
members are not "minorities" as that term is ordinarily used; they
are part of the American racial majority and are fully able to par-
ticipate in state and national political affairs.'
The underlying issue is broader, however. Even if no non-Indi-
ans lived on, or visited, Indian country, the separatist policy should
still have to be justified. If we agree that tribes are based on race-
and of course they are65-how can the United States countenance
separation consistent with the moral principles of Brown v. Board of
Education?66
The question I am raising is not the legality of separation. It is
clear that the special status of Indians, recognized in the Constitu-
tion, permits the existence of measured separatism. However, after
Brown, we should have doubts, moral doubts, about permitting any
race-based segment of the American population to withdraw alto-
gether from the larger polity. "Self-determination" is a very popu-
lar, generally unexamined justification these days for splintering
nations into smaller and smaller fragments. But which groups are
entitled to withdraw and "self-determine," as it were, and which
groups are not? Is the concept of "measured separatism" available
in the United States only to the American Indian-and perhaps the
Old Order Amish?67
This is not to suggest that there are no answers to these ques-
tions. In the case of the Indians, the fact that promises were made in
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id. at 111-19.
65. They are largely self-defining entities, id. at 7, and they can be "theocratic, heredi-
tary, and race-based in citizenship." Id. at 112. But see supra note 8 (cases concluding spe-
cial treatment of Indians not based on race).
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Jensen, supra note 5 (discussing policy of separation).
67. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Garet, Communality and Existenc"
The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001, 1029-36 (1983) (treating Indians and Amish
as conceptually similar groups).
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the past is certainly a factor of some moral significance, and the
policy of separation is already in place. However, many race-based
promises and many longstanding policies have fallen by the wayside
in the era of expanding civil rights. Some promises and some poli-
cies are more worthy than others, and the desirability of a measured
separatism is not a self-evident proposition. In this impressive
book, Professor Wilkinson has already demonstrated wide learning
in philosophy. Perhaps in his next work he will take this additional
analytical step.
